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Abstract 
Emotional-affective aspects of risk work are integral to risk management in many fields, 
particularly in human service organizations; yet rational notions of risk management often 
obscure these emotional-affective aspects.  In this chapter, we discuss the case of high risk 
mental healthcare (for people with personality disorders), characterised by both formal and 
informal risk management systems.  Drawing on sociomaterial perspectives, we explore 
empirically how affective dimensions of routine clinical risk work flow between these 
formal and informal risk management systems, affecting intersubjective relations and 
experiences.  We show how affect can ‘inflame’ incidents, producing heated interactions 
that escalate and ‘overflow’ through the risk management technologies, devices and 
systems intended to contain and manage them.  The chapter draws conclusions on 
dynamics of affective flows and overflows that are present – if less visible – in other areas 
of risk work. 
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The terms ‘clinical’ and ‘risk management’ are commonly associated with rational 
detachment and cold, objective calculation, emotionally removed from the subjective 
experience of dealing with sickness, injury and death.  In contrast, we suggest that emotion 
and affect are integral to the work of managing clinical risk, often involving the intimate 
handling of human subjects and their embodied subjectivities.  Dominant ideals of clinical 
risk management obscure these emotional-affective dimensions and what we describe 
below as ‘affective overflows’ in the ‘heat’ of day-to-day risk management (Dolan & Doyle, 
2000; Godin, 2004; Hirschhorn, 1999).  In day-to-day clinical practices emotions are 
materially entangled with the micro-technologies and devices of risk management, in its 
routine practices, habits and scripts (Fischer & Ferlie, 2013; Power, 2011).  Indeed, these 
practices reveal an informal and more ‘indigenous’ practice of clinical ‘risk work’, in which 
risk technologies and devices are tactically deployed, refashioned or undermined (Fischer, 
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2012; McGivern & Ferlie, 2007; McGivern & Fischer, 2010; 2012; Nicolini et al., 2011; 
Waring, 2005). 
 
The interaction between people and material objects – sociomateriality - is of growing 
scholarly interest (Cetina & Bruegger, 2000; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008; Star & Griesemer, 
1989;) and regarded as an intrinsic feature of everyday working practices.  Less attention 
though, has been paid to the way emotions, passions, fantasies and desires shape and 
‘animate’ this world of material objects. For example, in his manifesto for relational 
sociology, Emirbayer (1997; 311) advocates exploring ‘culture and collective emotions’ and 
notes that “the study of transpersonal emotional flows has remained seriously 
underdeveloped.” 
 
Studies of emotion within organizations generally consider intra- and inter-subjective 
emotion operating within and between individuals and groups (Fineman, 2008; Gabriel, 
1995, 1999), often elusively (Courpasson & Thoenig, 2010; Morrill, 1995; Roberts et al., 
2006).  However, emotions are inherently connected with desires, values and fantasies – 
and readily caught up with material objects.  These ‘affective intensities’ (Massumi, 2002; 
Thrift, 2008) confer emotional meaning and attachment to objects, which are ‘reworked’ 
as they come into and out of mental focus, continuously shaped and remade through 
changes in everyday practice.   
 
This affective dimension of risk management work has previously been suggested across 
diverse fields, including in studies of financial traders, accountants and auditors (Fenton-
O'Creevy et al., 2007, 2011, 2012).  For example, Guenin-Paracini et al.’s (2014) 
ethnographic study of a large audit firm found that risk was associated with the emotion 
of fear, which shaped accountants’ thoughts and use of techniques during audit processes.  
Similarly, Boedker and Chua’s (2013) study of a major corporation found that both affect 
and rational calculation generated energy and collective action as an ‘affective technology’ 
tied to circulating accounting practices and devices: 
 
“A flow of emotional energy that travels in networks of technology, people, images… technologies 
are important because they distribute and circulate affect in action nets ... Affect flows from non-
human devices to people and back again … its circulation via technology … act(ing) as a node 
in a network of affect production” (Boedker & Chua, 2013, pp. 262-263). 
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From this perspective, the affective dimension of organizational life involves shared 
‘intensities’, which circulate between subjective and material ‘realities’, affecting subjective 
experience and emotions, rather than emanating from them (Navaro-Yashin, 2012; 
Wetherell, 2012).  In contrast, previous empirical research (Fischer, 2008), has found that 
‘indigenous’ risk systems are more strongly imbued with intersubjective dynamics and 
meanings.  However, these (and all risk systems) have a dynamic tendency to acquire a 
public trajectory:  what begins as a latent risk representation may become an object of 
formal risk management (Castel, 1991; O'Malley, 2004; Power, 2007). 
 
In this chapter, we focus on clinical risk management in mental health care as an exemplary 
case of the submerged dynamics of indigenous risk systems.  Understanding the 
(necessarily) more intersubjective and embodied aspects of extreme cases can reveal 
dynamics that are present, if less visible, in other contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989).  To bring 
our material to the fore, we draw from an ethnography (Fischer, 2008) of a specialist health 
service for the treatment of a high risk patient group (people with personality disorders). 
 
We suggest, firstly, that practising health care elicits a mix of positive and negative 
emotional feelings connected with handling and being accountable for the care of other 
people – their bodily experiences, transformations, illnesses and sometimes death.  In 
classic studies, such as Menzies-Lyth’s (1960) psychoanalytic study of nurses’ defensive 
mechanisms, anxiety appears as a diffuse and generalised explanation of these experiences.  
However, this overlooks a more complex picture in which diverse subjective experiences 
are bound up with one another. 
 
Such ‘inter-subjectivity’ involves connections folded into human experience (Mitchell, 
2000; Mitchell & Aron, 1999). Crapanzano’s (1992, 2006) describes the experience of 
intersubjectivity as an ‘interlocutory drama’ that connects us with others – mediating our 
own experiences of ourselves and others. There is “nothing irrational, nothing even fictive 
about the scene… in its experience, in its description… Both the scene and ... objective 
reality are subjectively experienced.”  (Crapanzano, 2006, p. 398).  As this suggests, 
intersubjective experiences tend to be emotional ‘dramas’ filled with expectations, 
meanings and desires, which are continuously improvised and which unfold in often 
surprising and unpredictable ways. Such dramatisation arises in many contexts involving 
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emotional investments in the work of managing risk, but especially so in ‘human service 
organizations’ where there are expectations of balancing the desire for healing and care, 
with the wish to be protected from harm. 
 
Secondly, these dramas become entangled with material possessions, tools and artefacts.  
Indeed, we argue that intersubjective experiences involve a material focus, involving 
people as well as other material objects.  Influenced by anthropology, human geography 
and cultural theory, the scholarship on affect tends to focus on the so-called ‘affective 
intensities’ of physical objects, institutions and buildings, as though such objects 
themselves produce ‘affects’ on humans (see  Massumi, 2002; Thrift, 2008). However, this 
chapter suggests a different starting point for these intersubjective aspects in the context 
of clinical risk work. (For other intersubective accounts of affect, see Navaro-Yashin, 2012; 
Wetherell, 2012).  We argue that material objects do not have the ‘solidity’ they may appear 
to have, but are being continuously brought into being and shaped as part of the ‘making’ 
of risk.  As we describe below, devices and technologies that appear as background context 
in one moment can become dramatically ‘real’ in the heat of a crisis or near-miss.  Risks 
and their material representations thus reflect and ‘embody’ subjective experiences and 
projections that produce affects during incidents and crises.  
 
Finally, we argue that during dramas and crises, affective flows between indigenous and 
formal systems may become affectively ‘heated’ (Fischer & Ferlie, 2013).  As Callon (1998) 
argues, in such conditions ‘everything becomes controversial’, creating ‘overflows’ which 
can escalate, producing new risk objects and eroding arrangements for containment 
through expert framing. Indigenous clinical risk work reveals processes of ‘organizational 
becoming’ (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002) that are inherently caught up in ‘affective interactions’ 
between human subjects and the material objects, devices and technologies with which 
they work.  We empirically explore how complaints and whistleblowing affectively 
‘inflame’ incidents, producing heated interactions that ‘overflow’ (Callon, 1998) beyond 
the technologies and devices intended to contain and manage them. 
 
Overall, the chapter suggests that affective investments in the work of clinical risk 
management produce an ‘affective economy’ in which risk objects, technologies and 
devices circulate.  Whereas in ‘cool’ conditions risk management may proceed along 
intended decision pathways (Callon, 1998), when affect is added, interactions between 
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relational and formal risk management systems create turbulent flows (Fischer, 2008, 
2012), with repercussions for those invested and involved in the field.  As the case of 
mental health personality disorder services discussed below shows, affective flows and the 
tendency for overflows are an intrinsic aspect of clinical risk and its management. 
 
Personality disorder as a risk object 
 
The healthcare context is of general interest because technical, rational-analytic prescribed 
guidelines and standardised practices are blended with traditional clinical judgements, a 
‘felt’ sense, and an idealised empathic engagement with patients. For example, the ideal of 
‘a good bedside manner’ has become increasingly a focus of medical training and 
professional standards. Thus there is a potentially paradoxical dual trajectory towards 
technocratic healthcare on the one hand and informed patient choice involving equal and 
empathic engagement with patients on the other. 
 
The sub-field of psychiatry is an ideal case for exploring this dual trajectory and the ‘felt’ 
emotional aspects of healthcare.  In part, this is because psychiatry pays more attention to 
patients’ cognitions, emotions and subjective experiences than other medical sub-fields, 
but also because technical treatment emphasises relations and ‘therapeutic alliances’ 
between patients and clinicians over pharmacological or physical interventions.  Formal 
organizations also play a significant and visible role in psychiatric health care in the sense 
that organizational responses to clinical crises and risk management become the ‘front 
stage’ for risks which emerge from professional and patient communities that may be more 
or less attuned to the lives and experiences of their participants.  ‘Difficult to manage’ 
personality disorders provide an opportunity to study clinical risk management as it 
unfolds in the space between front and back stage, where emotional-affective indigenous 
clinical work interacts with risk systems but also, ultimately, with public policy issues.   
 
A number of high-profile homicides in the late 1990s, committed by people with mental 
illness, heightened public concern about the perceived risks presented by people with 
severe mental disorders.  Determined to tackle the dangers presented by people with such 
disorders, the UK government put public protection at the centre of its mental health 
policy (Department of Health & Home Office, 1999, 2000). It proposed legislation to 
allow the indefinite detention of people with severe mental disorders, based on presumed 
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risk to the public. What particularly exercised UK government attention, were the risks 
presented by people with severe personality disorders.  While medical psychiatry often 
considers severe personality disorders as untreatable, the realization that some people with 
these conditions were dangerous brought this issue into the political spotlight. 
 
Shortly after the UK 1997 general election, Michael Stone – a convicted psychopath – was 
arrested for the double homicide of Lin Russell and her six-year old daughter, Megan, the 
previous year. Her other daughter, nine-year old Josie, had been left for dead with severe 
head injuries producing public shock and outrage. A public enquiry attributed blame to 
severely flawed systems of risk management by mental health services (which had released 
him into the community after assessing his condition as untreatable) (Francis et al. 2006). 
 
While managing risk of violence or self-harm in personality disorder patients has been a 
longstanding focus in mental health and prisons, such rare but high profile cases of 
homicide in the 1990s, committed by people with either severe personality disorders or 
schizophrenia, drove the UK Government to introduce a National Service Framework for 
Mental Health.  Public protection from  ‘dangerous people’ became a policy priority and 
the new Labour government (Department of Health, 1998) produced a comprehensive 
mental health strategy covering topics ranging from promoting ‘healthy communities’ to 
ensuring the secure incarceration of people with severe mental illnesses, considered to be 
of greatest risk to others. A National Service Framework (Department of Health, 1999b) 
set out new statutory responsibilities for assessing and handling patients, differentiating 
and managing patients deemed to be at high risk of violence or self-harm (Home Office 
& Department of Health, 1999; National Institute for Mental Health in England, 2003). 
 
A Care Programme Approach (CPA) was developed as an interagency administrative 
framework for assessing, planning, coordinating and reviewing care plans (Department of 
Health, 1999a).  The CPA specifies arrangements for multidisciplinary, multiagency 
meetings requiring crisis and contingency plans, handover arrangements between agencies, 
recording and sharing records, and formally reviewing plans.  These requirements are 
managed by named key workers – usually nurses or social workers – who are responsible 
for coordinating and administering the framework. The new arrangements were overseen 
by statutory ‘clinical governance’ arrangements assigned to hospital boards as an 
accountability framework for assuring systematic standards of care, transparency, reporting 
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and care improvements. The boards were formally responsible for auditing their CPA 
framework on an annual basis. 
 
However, unlike patients with physical disorders, the engagement of people with 
personality disorders with a system like CPA can be difficult, even when they actively seek 
help. People with personality disorders tend to engage erratically with care programmes, 
often dropping out of treatment. High levels of emotional vulnerability prompt some to 
seek help only when they are in a state of crisis, often threatening suicide, or following self-
harm. Although relatively few treatments for personality disorders have been found to be 
effective, an influential report (Reed, 1994) argued that the Democratic Therapeutic 
Community (DTC) model had been shown to be more promising than other existing 
models of treatment. The DTC model involves full-time immersion in an intensive, 
demanding and psychologically challenging programme for up to a year.  The Department 
of Health commissioned a national DTC service consisting of three communities, along 
with well-resourced outreach teams operating across district mental health services. 
 
Methods and data 
Our empirical focus in what follows is based on a four year ethnographic study (Fischer, 
2008) of interorganizational relations between one of the DTCs and external agencies in 
health services, social care, high security hospitals and prisons.  One author (Fischer) had 
professional links to the DTCs and studied its clinical work and wider engagement across 
three UK inner-city conurbations and a rural area. During an initial 2 year phase, he 
explored care coordination and the transition of patients between services. In a second 
phase, the empirical material concentrated on the DTC itself and its relations with a 
broader set of agencies, including national commissioners and the Department of Health.  
Participant observations (195 hours), 76 in-depth formal interviews (1½-2 hours in 
duration), and informal interviews (over a period of seven years) were triangulated against 
clinical, management and policy texts collated during the study. 
 
Managing risk in local mental health services 
 
In our first example, drawn from an inner-city hospital, we see various ways in which 
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists attempt to prevent risk escalation by handling cases 
of personality disorder behind the scenes, drawing on emotional-relational techniques 
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rather than formal organizational processes.  Practitioners’ sensitivity to patients’ emotions 
is generally regarded as a valuable tool, providing insights into possible reactions or 
escalation of problems. Handling their patients, their own reactions, and colleagues’ 
emotions is an everyday aspect of psychiatrists’ and clinical psychologists’ work. 
 
“I don't like working with angry, antisocial men, they freak me out. I am irrationally 
uncomfortable with them and probably just not empathic. And I worry about bumping into them 
in the street, that they will come and track me down ... you hear of therapists being stalked by 
patients. And the other thing which freaks me out is that they are often very charming and you 
just feel: Jesus, I am getting sucked in here! They have done horrendous things to people and yet 
they are actually being quite nice, saying you are really helping me.” Clinical psychologist. 
 
“Doctors were thrashing around trying to find out what was the matter with me. And I was 
telling them but they didn't hear… All my suicide attempts were because nobody was listening to 
me, everyone got caught up in all of this self-harm stuff and seemed to think that was more serious 
than the real problem, which they just ignored completely, even though I was desperate. It was 
making me feel even more suicidal.” Patient. 
 
As one psychiatrist describes, emotional relations can spread and quickly escalate, 
especially where there is risk of harm. 
“They create massive anxiety - my colleagues come running, terrified because the patient’s talking 
about self harm.  These patients know our anxieties; they know how to engage the doctor, because 
that doctor is scared for his professional life, frightened about presiding over a patient who kills 
themselves.  They test you, they will say, ‘oh doctor I feel suicidal’; and they look you in the eye to 
see how you react. I feel dead anxious too. But it means we always act defensively, we end up 
admitting them (to hospital) because we have to be seen to be doing something, when sometimes 
doing nothing or putting responsibility back to the patient might be the best course of action.”  
Consultant psychiatrist 1. 
As we find in this example, emotions tend to readily flow between human subjects and 
systems of risk management, which can become articulated in various and contradictory 
ways within organizational settings. These include administrative and technological 
responses that tend towards diffusing risks (such as continuous observation and forcible 
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detention of patients under mental health legislation) as well as clinical responses that may 
seek to elicit greater patient responsibility. 
 
Interactions between professionals and patients thus tend to be mediated by responses to 
actual clinical risks (first order, acting in the patient’s best interests to prevent harm) and 
systems of formal risk management (second order risks, arising from challenges to the risk 
management system). 
“Professionals get their fingers burnt because these patients challenge the system and get detained 
for their own safety.  And the whole thing becomes increasingly confused, because the patient fights 
to come out and you end up restricting them even more, trying to stop them from hurting themselves, 
rather than addressing any underlying psychopathology. You feel, well, I have taken over a very 
difficult patient and have ended up being backed into a corner, with the patient detained. And 
the nursing staff all divided and are up in arms screaming at you, and the patient seems to be 
deteriorating, and I am trapped. What do I do next? It is very, very difficult.”  Consultant 
psychiatrist 2. 
Far from these formal risk management systems (including responses, such as physical 
detention or pharmacological sedation) being experienced as ‘cold’, clinical or 
organizational technologies that are external to emotional exchange, we see that emotion 
becomes embroiled within this risk system itself, attaching itself to the technologies and 
materials of risk management. This intersubjective entanglement with technologies can 
further intensify emotional reactions and clinical risk.  For this reason, experienced 
practitioners often seek to manage personality disorder patients invisibly, outside of formal 
risk management systems.  Although not formally visible, handling intersubjectivity and 
emotional reactions through private engagement increases the scope for clinically 
embedded risk management. 
So we find professionals working in a semi-autonomous capacity, managing clinical 
relations unencumbered by formal risk management arrangements. We see such clinical 
risk work as mediating between formal and informal risk management systems.  Indeed, 
especially for many experienced clinicians, working with difficult patients takes place 
through an informal and indigenous risk system, out of sight of the formal risk systems, 
and often the wider clinical care system. As one community psychiatrist described it, his 
personal style was like a ‘warm bath’ which his patients tended to want to stay in for long 
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periods. He kept in touch with one long-term patient who visited him (‘like an old friend’), 
several years after he had moved to a different country. More commonly, however, 
clinicians described striving to provide psychological ‘containment’ for personality 
disorder patients, relying more on a therapeutic alliance rather than interventions, and 
attempting to insulate them from the wider clinical and risk systems. 
“The service is not set up to cope with personality disorders, they end up being disliked and labelled 
as time wasters, it makes them worse and more entrenched.  I would never refer anyone with a 
personality disorder to the rest of the team. Anyone who I would see as personality disorder will 
inevitably stay (just) with me.” Consultant psychiatrist 3. 
This illustrates the dynamic tension between indigenous and formal risk systems. In the 
case of personality disorders, such tensions are not exceptional incidents requiring an 
emergency response, but are part of the everyday tensions and signs of trouble that 
practitioners are vigilant about – steering between relational and formal risk management 
as part of everyday work. 
 
These tensions become particularly salient when localised trouble escalates to formal 
complaints or whistleblowing involving external parties. One medical director described 
how his staff attempted to manage a patient through a more informal out-patient care – 
rather than run the risk of her repeating a pattern of escalating self-harm by admitting her 
to hospital. But this backfired as this patient attracted the attention of authorities: 
“(She) presented very dramatically, standing on the edge of a motorway bridge, blocking traffic… 
police helicopters out and everything… she actually fell from the bridge and was badly injured. 
The police were traumatised by it and released a lot of damaging information to the press… big 
newspaper headlines – a hatchet job.  No mention of the fact that she had had months as an 
inpatient, she was being managed through a seven days a week care plan, involved in all sorts of 
therapies. There were (Members of Parliament) involved, the authorities demanding weekly 
statements on what was happening.” Medical Director. 
As Callon (1998) suggests, the local handling of risk in complex and relationally ‘volatile’ 
cases such as this may produce ‘overflows’, shifting the focus from first order risks to the 
risk management systems. Whereas such escalation can increase tensions within formal 
(and reputational) risk management arrangements, this may be in direct conflict with the 
handling of clinical risks.  As our medical director describes it: 
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“(Our hospital) lawyers said if we had been in the coroner's court, it would have been very difficult 
to convince a jury of peers that (treating such a high risk patient as an outpatient) was a sensible 
plan. You have to understand the risks of doing things that seem crazy but are in the patient’s 
long term interests.” Medical director. 
In other words risk work can produce risk as emotions run high, producing affective flows 
and overflows beyond formal risk management systems. In this sense, in the case of 
complaints and whistleblowing, the risk management system may become ‘heated’ through 
this emotional economy of risk. This can create pressure to develop more elaborate 
informal and relational risk work practices to containing this ‘heating’ process. 
 
For instance, a multidisciplinary care team became divided over whether they should work 
with a patient who some believed posed a risk to children. Unable to resolve the conflict 
internally, their manager referred the issue to the hospital CEO:   
 
“It was really destructive and created a big split in the team. The service wasn’t geared up for 
dealing with this level of risk. We were never going to meet his needs but just compound his 
frustration and further increase his risky behaviour. There was a real deadlock. Eventually it was 
resolved because this man was excellent at complaining, flagging up deficits in our service to the 
highest echelons, it made everybody really anxious. In the end, our CEO and the director of social 
services ended up having weekly (counselling) sessions with him. It was incredibly bizarre!”  Head 
of Psychology. 
While such indigenous clinical risk management work is often invisible to formal risk 
systems, it is an important aspect of clinical work. The dynamics of emotional 
entanglement between people and the risk systems and technologies produce unexpected 
flows and overflows to other parties, altering usual decision path dependencies. In the next 
section, we explore how ‘materiality’ operates as part of this emotional economy of risk.  
The DTC: Shifts between informal and formal riskwork systems 
 
The Democratic Therapeutic Community (DTC) system had been identified as one of the 
few successful clinical treatments for personality disorders (Reed, 1994), requiring an 
intensive re-socialisation programme involving full time residential treatment over a period 
of 12 months.  The DTC was run using a complex set of rules and a structured programme 
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of groupwork designed to ‘slow incidents down’ so that they could be discussed and 
‘worked through’ over time (often several days), before making decisions and taking action. 
 
Risk assessment and management were seen as the principle therapeutic task, requiring all 
current and prospective DTC members to learn to recognise and understand their own 
emotions and those of others, as a means of handling the potential for risk escalation. 
Indeed, patients were seen as more effective and accurate assessors of clinical risk than 
clinical staff, and they generally had a strong personal investment in keeping the DTC ‘a 
safe space’. Accordingly they played a significant role in running the DTC (the elected ‘Top 
Three’ patients jointly led the day-to-day running of the community, together with a senior 
team of doctors, psychologists and nurses), as well as clinical decision-making, voting on 
who should be admitted to, or discharged from, the unit. 
 
The DTC’s rules were democratically determined, interpreted and occasionally amended, 
based on long-established principles of democratisation (the full community of patients 
and staff make clinical and management decisions throughout the day through democratic 
voting); communalism (all members are required to participate in the life of running the 
community, such as cleaning and preparing meals); permissiveness (members are expected 
to interact authentically and to ‘surface’ problem issues and behaviours); and reality 
confrontation (members are expected to learn and take responsibility for the impact of 
their behaviour on others) (Rapoport, 1960).  Meetings of the full community could be 
called at any time of the day or night to manage emerging incidents or crises until the 
following scheduled community meeting. 
 
Emphasis was placed on patients identifying and managing risks within the community.  
The DTC ran a daily timetable of small and large group activities from morning until late 
evening, which all patients and staff were expected to fully participate fully in as the DTC’s 
model of therapeutic treatment, and its core technology for identifying, assessing and 
managing clinical risk.  Outside of formal group activities, members were expected to take 
any concern or issues to Top Three who, together with staff, would decide whether to call 
an emergency meeting of the full community, or to provide informal support until the next 
scheduled meeting.  As one therapist described it: 
 
“If the culture of enquiry is not carried by residents, it becomes something that the staff are left to 
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do. And when questions come from staff rather than residents, we are accused of being too 
psychotherapeutic (and) making residents feel vulnerable and abused. The longer (this) goes on, 
the less communication takes place, and momentum builds for things to take place behind the 
scenes.”  
A major aspect of this collective risk work was the process of selecting and ‘constructing’ 
risks, which often develop through a rather fragmented and accidental clustering of events.  
For instance, a heated altercation developed during a daily community meeting between 
Simon (patient) and John (a senior therapist), triggered by a comment that Simon 
interpreted as a ‘put-down’. 
Simon explodes in anger, protesting that John’s got it in for him – he’s always on his case… 
another exchange promptly follows. Simon mutters (ambiguously) ‘if you think you can do that, 
think again.’ John, visibly flushed and agitated, protests that Simon’s ‘threat’ is completely 
unacceptable: ‘we don’t do that kind of thing in here, it’s not on.’ Frustrated, Simon storms out 
of the unit… feeling provoked by John and ‘sick of being controlled.’  Extract from fieldnotes. 
 
As members tried to work out how to make sense of what John perceived as Simon’s 
‘threat’, there was uncertainty and effort in constructing this as a risk. Few had noticed 
much of the interaction between the two. Overall, the community was sympathetic to 
Simon feeling ‘picked on’ by staff. Some clinicians seemed uncertain as to whether Simon’s 
comment was intended as a threat. John looked awkwardly for reassurance from 
colleagues, and seemed even less certain about his interpretation after the meeting.  
Perhaps he had just overreacted? Yet in a subsequent staff debriefing, John’s continuing 
emotional reaction to the exchange persuaded the staff team that Simon should face the 
consequences of his aggressive outburst.  
 
After speaking with staff, Top Three called an emergency meeting of the community which 
(after much debate) voted to technically ‘discharge’ Simon from the community.  However, 
under the community’s structured system of rules, they allowed him to request a temporary 
24-hour ‘sleeping-in extension’ to renegotiate his membership of the community.  While 
formally suspended from the community and no longer permitted to vote in community 
meetings, a condition for renewing his temporary extension was his willingness to review 
his perceptions, behaviour and attitude, in the daily community meetings. Members were, 
in turn, required to assess his commitment to the community and the risks he presented 
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to himself and others, and to review and vote on his extension every 24 hours.  They finally 
elected to re-instate him as a community member after the maximum permitted extension 
of 72 hours.  
 
Such risk reviews were conducted as part of the daily community meetings, which were 
ritualistic and formalised in tone.  Led by the ‘Top Three’ patients, the proceedings 
followed a structured agenda, recording ‘missed groups’ (patients were considered to have 
‘suspended themselves’ if they missed three groups), reviewing ‘referred meetings’ 
(emergency meetings with patients ‘at risk’), noting rule-breaking, feeding back 
unstructured leisure time, and planning meals and cleaning rotas.  An elected secretary 
minuted the meetings in detail and then read the minutes (at length) in a morning 
community meeting the next day.  Meetings involved frequent votes for decision-making 
based upon a set protocol: a five minute open discussion, followed by a proposal from the 
chair, a call for objections, and then a vote based on a show of hands (both staff and 
patients are required to vote).  Two ‘tellers’ finally counted and recorded votes for, against, 
and abstentions. 
 
The meeting is very formal (ritualised), starting with a name-round ‘for the visitor’. There was a 
reading of the previous day’s very detailed minutes and notes of discussion, which seemed verbatim 
... This was listened to in silence, with an almost religious respect ... It felt the reading was being 
received like a sacred text in a monastery.  Extract from fieldnotes. 
Although a central part of the DTC’s functioning, the content of these meetings and their 
minutes were treated as confidential and formally invisible to the wider CPA and clinical 
governance requirements. As a record of community events, rather than individual patient 
case notes, they were not shared with outside agencies. In line with the DTC treatment 
model (as a group-based model in which there is no individual therapy) staff did not record 
separate case notes of clinical care. 
Importantly, however, this approach to assessing, planning and reviewing care was 
translated into how the DTC contributed to its formal CPA requirements. When 
producing written reports for outside agencies, patients were involved in assessing each 
other’s risk, determining their future care needs, and (usually, but not always with a clinical 
staff member) providing written accounts of their treatment.  The DTC insisted upon 
patients attending their interagency CPA meetings to contribute to the assessment, 
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planning and review process.  Often to the surprise of other agencies (who tend to treat 
the CPA as an administrative exercise), DTC patients also brought along one or more 
other patients with the intention of supporting them. 
“The client wrote her own assessment report, saying she was just about to leave and how well she’d 
done. We don't know what goes on because the DTC gives you very little information. And so 
the client comes to the CPA meeting with this report and her agenda. I am like, WHAT? Clients 
don't have agendas - we tell them! So that’s all been quite threatening for some staff, especially the 
psychiatrists. And we’ve had to walk a real tightrope with this client, trying to explain you can’t 
just walk in and demand all these things from services, because when you do, they just cut you 
off.” Social work manager. 
The DTC’s collective methods for identifying and creating risk objects can be seen as an 
elaborate and embedded ‘indigenous system’ of clinical risk work that is strongly based on 
relational forms of risk management. Whereas not all risks were necessarily brought into 
the DTC’s community meetings (incidents take place in private, in the evenings and 
sometimes outside of the community) this system was designed to be responsive and 
“concertina-like” in bringing clinical riskwork closer to the underlying uncertainty and flux 
of possible and actual incidents in patients’ everyday lives.  For example, a request to Top 
Three for ‘floors and doors’ would result in a rota of patients sleeping on the floor or 
remaining awake outside the bedroom of a patient feeling vulnerable, to provide active 
support through the night.  In keeping with this indigenous system, the textual 
representations of these risks was recorded and recited as confidential community minutes 
that remained invisible to, and unaudited by, formal risk management procedures. 
 
Affective overflows into the policy domain 
 
A critical incident produced a significant change in the way the DTC and its hospital board 
handled clinical risks.  A former DTC patient murdered his partner, several weeks after 
being discharged from the community. Health authorities reacted by instigating a ‘root and 
branch’ comprehensive risk assessment of the entire service to bring the DTC ‘in line’ with 
the working of other psychiatric units. The hospital board commissioned specialists in 
forensic psychiatry to conduct an inquiry, emphasising actuarial (statistics-based) models 
of risk prediction, rather than the DTC’s model of clinical judgement. New formal risk 
management arrangements required regular staff audits and upward reporting of risks, such 
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as ‘ligature points’ (physical features that could provide a noose for strangulation). 
Arrangements included formally recording and reporting discussions with patients, 
including ‘advice on clinical risks’ and discharge planning. Hospital managers challenged 
the idea of patients’ equal participation in the CPA process, insisting that clinical authority 
should override patient opinion. 
 
The introduction of these new formal risk arrangements heightened DTC members’ 
emotional reactions (of bereavement, guilt and self-blame) to the homicide, and added to 
anxiety about what some staff perceived to be a ‘witch hunt’ as they “(waited) for the finger 
of blame to be pointed.” However, they also disrupted the DTC’s indigenous risk 
management system, as staff adopted a more procedural mindset.  Patients perceived this 
as a betrayal of the DTC’s democratic methods. 
 
A key change was the manner in which risks were identified and materially represented 
within the DTC, shifting from open and exploratory practices of ‘slowing things down’ to 
a more ‘heated’ process of rapidly identifying and formally reporting risks.  For example, 
widespread drug and alcohol use within the DTC was discovered one night after a violent 
disturbance (a patient “lost it” and started throwing furniture), to which police were called. 
Anxious to reassert clinical authority, the DTC clinical team immediately discharged 
several patients who they believed to be directly responsible, and insisted that remaining 
patients formally consent to random drug and alcohol testing by local police. During the 
morning’s community meeting, DTC leaders introduced hospital consent forms that they 
handed to patients, passing them between each other in silence. A few patients ran from 
the room in tears. Most of those remaining signed the forms, reluctantly consenting to the 
police taking random samples of their saliva, urine, blood and hair at any time of day or 
night. 
 
I’m struck by the seemingly draconian and legalistic consent form ... The clinical director is taking 
advice from the drugs liaison police. Afterwards, junior staff disagree about the new arrangements: 
‘we are far too reactive, we really undermine the residents… constantly checking up on them and 
it’s really not helping’ ... But DTC leaders insist their decision is not going to be reversed. Extract 
from fieldnotes 
Staff feelings of anger, resentment and betrayal by increasingly ‘untrustworthy’ patients 
were integral to the way that these risks were perceived and constructed.  Amongst 
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patients, these new arrangements were experienced not as neutral ‘technologies’ (Miller & 
Rose, 2008) but as emotionally and morally laden, and with a perceived wish to blame and 
punish. 
 
Instead of community meetings operating as a ‘safe space’ for surfacing and exploring 
emerging risks, they became points of tension between formal and informal risk systems. 
 
“It’s like a prison stand-off… trying to psyche each other out. Who’s going to break first? Who’s 
going to be able to stay silent the longest? The most powerful people are the ones who say nothing.” 
Patient. 
During a routine community meeting ‘visited’ by senior managers, for instance, they 
suspected that two patients were in a sexual relationship, which was discouraged, rather 
than prohibited according to DTC rules.  Afterwards the senior managers insisted that the 
clinical director should stop their relationship, if necessary by threatening the pair with 
immediate discharge. 
“We said to the clinical director: look, you need to do something to stop it. These people should 
be concentrating on their therapy… A lot of work had to go on from here to say have you counselled 
those individuals, have you recorded that you have counselled (them), and have you advised the 
different agencies.” Hospital manager. 
With escalating disturbance developing ‘behind the scenes’ amongst patients and in 
confrontations with staff, clinical identification and upwards reporting of risk (through 
daily risk reports) produced an increasingly ‘heated’ sense of conflict – with the unintended 
perverse consequence of increasing substantive (first order) and constructed (second 
order) risks. 
“There is not one community here - there are two. I really don’t trust staff. You can’t call it a 
community when you can’t talk with them about anything…you can’t call it democratic.” 
Patient. 
“The past months have been hell …a complete lack of trust … There was no protected time, no 
retreat ... it’s like a year in Beirut.” Patient. 
An important dimension of risk escalation within and beyond the DTC is its repercussions 
within the clinical setting. The dynamics of overflow were significant beyond the setting, 
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in terms of reshaping wider perceptions of risk and especially notions of what constitutes 
the relevant risk object to be managed.  However, these perceptions and reactions also 
shaped how clinical risk was managed internally and, as we have seen, how clinicians and 
managers orientated themselves to handling an increasing range of circulating risk objects.  
As one senior manager commented, this sense of progressively tense risk negotiations 
between patients, clinicians and managers tended to reinforce the confusion and ‘heat’ in 
the risk management system. 
 
“I deliberately don’t get close to operational delivery.  You can see other… directors getting pulled 
in and you can see how all-consuming it is.  So I have tried to keep a bit of a distance so I can 
try to help them think logically.  There’s been an awful lot of emotion for them. It is really like 
being in a total institution - you give your whole life to that service.”  Hospital manager. 
 
Indeed, such tensions were further fueled by the DTC senior managers’ sensitivity to wider 
reactions as uncertainty about the risk management arrangements caught the attention of 
the national commissioners who “didn’t understand the model, acted highly emotionally 
(and) upped the ante even more… It makes the Board anxious, it really does” (senior 
executive).  As one official commented, the DTC was perceived as “poisonous . . . the 
atmosphere is so intense that people just get fried up. I have never…faced that degree of 
hostility. It is the only organization that (the national commissioners) agreed never to meet 
single-handed” (senior official).  
 
Although such wider reactions are important and interesting in illustrating the dynamics 
of overflow in risk management systems, the most salient aspect for our analysis were their 
local effects upon the DTC, in particular the amplification of perceived threats arising from 
second order risk management. Officials lost confidence in the service, and ultimately 
closed all three units (even though they had received a positive, independent evaluation, 
(Fiander et al., 2004)).  Significant factors in  this closure process were the affective 
tensions that were mobilised within and beyond the DTC and expressed in its system of 
clinical risk management. 
 
“I’m astounded at the failure…to support the place. We end up with the service collapsing because 
it did was what it was asked to do…politically, there were some ‘shenanigans’ went on and the 
thing collapsed. There is a serious underestimation of the dynamics of these (interorganizational) 
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relationships and how they work” Senior official.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
The cases of the hospital setting and the DTC environment analysed in this chapter point 
to how affective components of clinical risk work may be influenced by intersubjective 
relations within ‘ordinary’ clinical practice. We suggest that this is an under-explored area 
that may rebalance previous studies of emotional reactions evoked through formal risk 
management systems (Fischer & Ferlie, 2013; McGivern & Fischer, 2012).  Furthermore, 
future studies should take a ‘sociomaterial turn’ in order to understand these ‘back stage’ 
dynamics of clinical risk management, as an important yet under-explored aspect of risk 
management technologies.  In conclusion, we suggest three implications for the future 
analysis of the routines and ‘facticity’ (Power et al., 2009) of everyday risk management 
and its inherently emotion-laden character. 
 
The intersubjective dynamics of affective flow in everyday clinical work. 
 
Firstly, the cases in this chapter show how the intersubjective dynamics and tensions of 
staff-patient relations necessarily bring affect and risk together.  Patients and staff attempt 
to engage but often end up talking past each other: staff “got caught up in all of this self 
harm stuff and seemed to think that was more serious than the real (clinical) problem”.  
Indeed, staff tend to be strongly affected by this interrelationship, producing a sense of 
affective contagion. Their perceptions of possible or actual danger connect interpersonal 
tensions and reactions within the clinical interaction, with implied or actual threat of risk 
technologies being (potentially) invoked. In this sense, staff experience being ‘made to feel’ 
tensions that are both intersubjective in relation to particular patients yet simultaneously 
relate to the risk management systems.  This suggests that formal risk technologies are not 
somehow separate from, but intrinsically bound up with these staff-patient interactions, 
and embedded in routine clinical assessment, treatment, and rehabilitation.  Clinical risk is 
thus constructed and experienced as threatening and potentially overwhelming.   
 
Invoking and using risk technologies is affectively & morally laden, entailing local material effects. 
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Secondly, the DTC case reveals how texts, devices and material technologies are an 
essential part of the community interaction. These are powerfully brought into play as part 
of the risk management process, increasing forms of relational control (sometimes referred 
to in clinical settings as ‘relational security’), and shifting power dynamics in ways that may 
exacerbate tensions.  They may function as part of a self-regulating system creating 
potential ‘cooling’ and regulating effects, or possibly produce ‘heating’ dynamics that 
exacerbate tensions (Fischer, 2012).  Our point is that these risk technologies are brought 
into play as already affectively laden with institutional and clinical meanings, and which 
acquire further meanings and influence as particular relationships develop. 
 
For example, our analysis of Simon’s ‘threatening behaviour’ in the DTC, reveals an 
emergent process of risk identification within micro-level interactions. Whereas the DTC’s 
perception of actual risk was initially hesitant and uncertain, it was shaped and transformed 
through a sequence of staff and community meetings and voting rules - a core DTC 
method for assessing and discussing risk management.  As risk identification technologies, 
these initial meetings and procedures strengthened the idea of risk within the clinical 
interaction, helping to fuel emotional reactions and the perception of Simon as presenting 
a risk of harm.  Once this risk object was collectively formed, the DTC then proceeded to 
treat it according to the well-established rules of the formal risk management system. 
 
This collective production of risk objects involves individual patients being actively 
constructed as risky or at risk.  In the case of Simon, the patient reaction and 
resistance/defiance added further weight to the collective emerging sense of threat, which 
was seen as justifying the risk management response, even when some staff doubted the 
accuracy of the original assessment.  So we suggest that, whereas risk management may be 
designed to cool problems, its effects in practice may be to increase a sense of threat, fear 
and blame, potentially increasing tensions within the specific setting. 
 
These insights from the DTC setting are consistent with Douglas’s (1992) broader thesis 
that risk is tied to emotions, affect and moral values, with associated dimensions of fault 
and blame acting as rhetorical resources.  She shows how risks are selected by groups and 
evaluated in terms of their potential consequences as political, aesthetic and moral matters.  
Indeed, we have empirically shown how, in a range of different clinical contexts, how 
participants fear the operations and effects of risk technologies often more than actual 
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risks (McGivern & Ferlie, 2007; McGivern & Fischer, 2010; 2012).  These risk technologies 
may thus produce the unintended consequence of motivating clinicians to cover up issues 
connected to actual clinical risk because they are anxious about being blamed and 
scapegoated.    
 
How affect overflows through risk management systems - the container becomes the uncontained 
 
Finally, in this chapter we have shown that, when ‘heated’, intersubjective emotions affect 
and can overwhelm risk management systems designed to contain them, producing 
escalation and overflows. Following Callon (1998) we suggested that such systems can 
become the conduit for escalation as risk moves beyond the original settings, increasing 
the difficulties of containment.  We also found that heated interpersonal conflicts arising 
between medical professionals (McGivern & Ferlie, 2007) or between patients and 
clinicians (Fischer & Ferlie, 2013a; McGivern & Fischer, 2012) may lead them to construct 
cases of clinical risk which then escalate to become a source of further risk.  In this sense, 
risk objects shift beyond patients as staff, managers, and risk technologies themselves 
become the objects of risk; this process has a dynamic fluidity that influences and shapes 
the ‘solidity’ of risk devices and technologies.  Mundane processes, devices and inscriptions 
shift meanings and uses, reshaping experiences and perceptions of organizational dynamics 
beyond the original sites of risk.  As we have described in the case of the DTC, affective 
overflows in riskwork may at times overwhelm managerial and policy arrangements for 
risk management, resulting in the decline and even collapse of clinical services. 
 
 
References 
 
Boedker, Christina, & Chua, Wai Fong. (2013). Accounting as an affective technology: A 
study of circulatin, agency and entrancement. Accounting Organizations and Society, 38, 
245-267.  
Callon, Michel. (1998). An essay on framing and overflowing: Economic externalities 
revisited by sociology. The Sociological Review, 46(S1), 244-269.  
Castel, Robert. (1991). From dangerousness to risk. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller 
(Eds.), The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality (pp. 281-298). Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
23 
 
Cetina, Karin Knorr, & Bruegger, Urs. (2000). The market as an object of attachment: 
Exploring postsocial relations in financial markets. The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 
25(2), 141-168.  
Courpasson, David, & Thoenig, Jean-Claude. (2010). When managers rebel. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Crapanzano, Vincent. (1992). Hermes' dilemma and Hamlet's desire: On the epistemology of 
interpretation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Crapanzano, Vincent. (2006). The scene: Shadowing the real. Anthropological Theory, 6(4), 
387-405.  
Department of Health. (1998). Modernising mental health services: Safe, sound and 
supportive. London: Department of Health. 
Department of Health. (1999a). Effective care coordination in mental health services: 
Modernising the Care Programme Approach. London: Department of Health. 
Department of Health. (1999b). National service framework for mental health: Modern 
standards and service models. London: Department of Health. 
Department of Health, & Home Office. (1999). Managing dangerous people with severe 
personality disorder: Proposals for policy development. London: HMSO. 
Department of Health, & Home Office. (2000). Reforming the Mental Health Act: Part 
II, high risk patients. Cm5016-II. London: The Stationery Office. 
Dolan, Mairead, & Doyle, Michael. (2000). Violence risk prediction: Clinical and actuarial 
measures and the role of the Psychopathy Checklist. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 
177(4), 303-311.  
Douglas, Mary. (1992). Risk and blame: Essays in cultural theory. London: Routledge. 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. (1989). Building theories from case-study research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 532-550.  
Emirbayer, Mustafa. (1997). Manifesto for a relational sociology. American Journal of 
Sociology, 103(2), 281-317.  
Fenton-O'Creevy, Mark, Lins, Jeffrey T, Vohra, Shalini, Richards, Daniel W, Davies, 
Gareth, & Schaaff, Kristina. (2012). Emotion regulation and trader expertise: Heart 
rate variability on the trading floor. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 
5(4), 227-237.  
Fenton-O'Creevy, Mark, Nicholson, Nigel, Soane, Emma, & Willman, Paul. (2007). 
Traders: Risks, decisions, and management in financial markets. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
24 
 
Fenton-O'Creevy, Mark, Soane, Emma, Nicholson, Nigel, & Willman, Paul. (2011). 
Thinking, feeling and deciding: The influence of emotions on the decision making 
and performance of traders. Journal of Organizational Behaviour(8), 1044-1081.  
Fiander, Matthew, Burns, Tom, Langham, Sue, & Normand, Charles. (2004). (DTC) 
replication study - clinical progress & health economic strands integrated final 
report. London: St George's Hospital Medical School, University of London. 
Fineman, Stephen (Ed.). (2008). The emotional organization: Passions and power. Malden: 
Blackwell. 
Fischer, Michael D. (2008). An ethnographic study of turbulence in the management of personality 
disorders: An interorganisational perspective. Ph.D Thesis, Imperial College London, 
University of London: UK.    
Fischer, Michael D. (2012). Organizational turbulence, trouble and trauma: Theorizing the 
collapse of a mental health setting. Organization Studies, 33(9), 1153-1173.  
Fischer, Michael D, & Ferlie, Ewan. (2013). Resisting hybridisation between modes of 
clinical risk management: Contradiction, contest, and the production of intractable 
conflict. Accounting Organizations and Society, 38(1), 30-49.  
Gabriel, Yiannis. (1995). The unmanaged organization: Stories, fantasies and subjectivity. 
Organization Studies, 16(3), 477-501.  
Gabriel, Yiannis. (1999). Organizations in depth: The psychoanalysis of organizations. London: 
Sage. 
Godin, Paul. (2004). 'You don't tick boxes on a form': A study of how community mental 
health nurses assess and manage risk. Health, Risk & Society, 6(4), 347-360.  
Guénin-Paracini, Henri, Malsch, Bertrand, & Paillé, Anne Marché. (2014). Fear and risk in 
the audit process. Accounting, Organizations & Society, 39(4), 264-288.  
Hirschhorn, Larry (1999). The primary risk. Human Relations, 52(1), 5-23.  
Home Office, & Department of Health. (1999). Managing dangerous people with severe 
personality disorder: Proposals for policy development. London: Home Office. 
Massumi, Brian. (2002). Parables for the virtual: movement, affect, sensation. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
McGivern, Gerry, & Ferlie, Ewan. (2007). Playing tick-box games: Interrelating defences 
in professional appraisal. Human Relations, 60(9), 1361-1385.  
McGivern, Gerry, & Fischer, Michael D. (2010). Medical regulation, spectacular 
transparency and the blame business. Journal of Health Organization and Management, 
24(6), 597-610.  
25 
 
McGivern, Gerry, & Fischer, Michael D. (2012). Reactivity and reactions to regulatory 
transparency in medicine, psychotherapy and counselling. Social Science and Medicine, 
74(3), 289-296.  
Menzies Lyth, Isabel. (1960). A case study in the functioning of social systems as a defence 
against anxiety: A report on a study of the nursing service of a general hospital. 
Human Relations, 13(2), 95-121.  
Mitchell, Stephen A. (2000). Relationality: From attachment to intersubjectivity. Hillsdale: Analytic 
Press. 
Mitchell, Stephen A, & Aron, Lewis (Eds.). (1999). Relational psychoanalysis: The emergence of a 
tradition. Hillsdale: Analytic Press. 
Morrill, Calvin. (1995). The executive way: Conflict management in corporations. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
National Institute for Mental Health in England. (2003). Personality disorder - no longer 
a diagnosis of exclusion: Policy implementation guidance for the development of 
services for people with personality disorder. London. 
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. (2012). The make-believe space: Affective geography in a postwar polity. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Nicolini, Davide, Waring, Justin, & Mengis, Jeanne. (2011). The challenges of undertaking 
root cause analysis in health care: A qualitative study. Journal of Health Service Research 
and Policy, 16, 34-41.  
O'Malley, Pat. (2004). Risk, uncertainty and government. London: Glasshouse Press. 
Orlikowski, Wanda J., & Scott, Susan V. (2008). Sociomateriality: Challenging the 
separation of technology, work and organization. The Academy of Management Annals, 
2(1), 433-474.  
Power, Michael. (2007). Organized uncertainty: Designing a world of risk management. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Power, Michael. (2011). Foucault and sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 37(1), 35-56.  
Power, Michael, Scheytt, Tobias, Soin, Kim, & Sahlin, Kerstin. (2009). Reputational risk as 
a logic of organizing in late modernity. Organization Studies, 30(301-324).  
Rapoport, Robert N. (1960). Community as doctor: New perspectives on a therapeutic community. 
London: Tavistock. 
Reed, John. (1994). Report of the Department of Health and Home Office working group 
on psychopathic disorder. London: Department of Health and Home Office. 
26 
 
Roberts, John, Sanderson, Paul, Barker, Richard, & Hendry, John. (2006). In the mirror of 
the market: The disciplinary effects of company/fund manager meetings. 
Accounting Organizations and Society, 31(3), 277-294.  
Star, Susan Leigh, & Griesemer, James R. (1989). Institutional ecology, 'translations' and 
boundary objects: Amateurs and professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate 
Zoology, 1907-39. Social Studies of Science, 19(3), 387-420.  
Thrift, Nigel J. (2008). Non-representational theory: Space, politics, affect. London: Routledge. 
Tsoukas, H., & Chia, R. (2002). On organizational becoming: Rethinking organizational 
change. Organization Science, 13(5), 567-582.  
Waring, Justin J. (2005). Beyond blame: Cultural barriers to medical incident reporting. 
Social Science and Medicine, 60(9), 1927-1935.  
Wetherell, Margaret. (2012). Affect and emotion: A new social science understanding. Los Angeles, 
Calif.: Sage. 
 
 
 
